Binocular rivalry occurs when the eyes are presented with different stimuli and subjective perception alternates between them. Though recent years have seen a number of models of this phenomenon, the mechanisms behind binocular rivalry are still debated and we still lack a principled understanding of why a cognitive system such as the brain should exhibit this striking kind of behaviour. Furthermore, psychophysical and neurophysiological (single cell and imaging) studies of rivalry are not unequivocal and have proven difficult to reconcile within one framework. This review takes an epistemological approach to rivalry that considers the brain as engaged in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference about the causes of its sensory input. We describe a simple empirical Bayesian framework, implemented with predictive coding, which seems capable of explaining binocular rivalry and reconciling many findings. The core of the explanation is that selection of one stimulus, and subsequent alternation between stimuli in rivalry occur when: (i) there is no single model or hypothesis about the causes in the environment that enjoys both high likelihood and high prior probability and (ii) when one stimulus dominates, the bottom-up, driving signal for that stimulus is explained away while, crucially, the bottom-up signal for the suppressed stimulus is not, and remains as an unexplained but explainable prediction error signal. This induces instability in perceptual dynamics that can give rise to perceptual transitions or alternations during rivalry.
a b s t r a c t
Binocular rivalry occurs when the eyes are presented with different stimuli and subjective perception alternates between them. Though recent years have seen a number of models of this phenomenon, the mechanisms behind binocular rivalry are still debated and we still lack a principled understanding of why a cognitive system such as the brain should exhibit this striking kind of behaviour. Furthermore, psychophysical and neurophysiological (single cell and imaging) studies of rivalry are not unequivocal and have proven difficult to reconcile within one framework. This review takes an epistemological approach to rivalry that considers the brain as engaged in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference about the causes of its sensory input. We describe a simple empirical Bayesian framework, implemented with predictive coding, which seems capable of explaining binocular rivalry and reconciling many findings. The core of the explanation is that selection of one stimulus, and subsequent alternation between stimuli in rivalry occur when: (i) there is no single model or hypothesis about the causes in the environment that enjoys both high likelihood and high prior probability and (ii) when one stimulus dominates, the bottom-up, driving signal for that stimulus is explained away while, crucially, the bottom-up signal for the suppressed stimulus is not, and remains as an unexplained but explainable prediction error signal. This induces instability in perceptual dynamics that can give rise to perceptual transitions or alternations during rivalry.
Ó 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Introduction
If one stimulus is shown to one eye and another stimulus to the other, then subjective experience alternates between them. For example, when an image of a house is presented to one eye and an image of a face to the other, then subjective experience alternates between the house and the face. This is known as binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry is a challenge to our understanding of the visual system, and it is of special importance for studies of phenomenal consciousness in humans and monkeys, because the stimulus presented to subjects can be held constant while the phenomenal percept changes (Frith, Perry, & Lumer, 1999; Koch, 2004) .
There have been many empirical studies of binocular rivalry but the data they produce are conflicting and it is very difficult to give them an unequivocal interpretation. A number of proposals have been made but the neurocognitive mechanism that explains this striking visual effect remains unresolved (for reviews and overviews, see Alais & Blake, 2005; Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Leopold & Logothetis, 1999; Tong, Meng, & Blake, 2006) . There are recent formal models that can explain a growing number of psychophysical findings and which fit with a range of neurophysiological facts (Koene, 2006; Moreno-Bote, Rinzel, & Rubin, 2007; Noest, van Ee, Nijs, & van Wezel, 2007; Wilson, 2007) , and there is a general trend towards approaches that integrate top-down and bottom-up
